Regulation by Information: The Role of Information and Expertise in EU Agencies

(Cristoph Klika, Maastricht University)

In line with the international trend of 'agencification' we see an increasing trend of delegation of highly diverging tasks to independent agencies within the European Union. Given the ever rising size of administrative tasks and the rising complexities of many policy fields, agencies are expected to provide specific information and thus to ensure that policy solutions are prepared in an unbiased, objective and efficient way. At the same time, it is assumed that administrative actors may exert influence by exploiting informational asymmetries vis-à-vis decision-makers relying on formal mandates ('politics of information'). Several scholars agree on the thesis that the informational role that many agencies have, grants them substantial influence. Such conclusions are rather speculative, however, and relatively little is known about the way information is produced and processed; and subsequently whether this information is a resource of administrative influence.

While theoretical and normative analyses of topics such as agency creation, accountability and legitimacy are widespread, empirical insight into the role of information is far and few between. Building on inter-organisation theory and social network analysis, this paper will come to grips with the 'politics of information' by investigating the role of information and expertise in EU agencies.